United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CRITES-LEONI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Travis Like, an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center
(“SECC”), brought this action pro se
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at SECC,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. This matter
is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. (Doc. 25.) For the following reasons, the Court
will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Complaint, Like names Ian Wallace, warden at SECC at all
times relevant to this action; and Donna Wigfall, Functional
Unit Manager at SECC, as Defendants. Like alleges that Defendant
Wigfall violated his Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him
of soap, shampoo, and lotion in January of 2015. (Doc. 5 at
p. 6.) He also alleges that Defendant Wallace violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by ordering the removal of towels
from Like's cell on August 26, 2015. Id.
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that
there are no genuine issues of material fact, and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants further
argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
did not respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and the time for doing so has expired.
Summary Judgment Standard
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court
may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court demonstrates that “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273
(8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this
burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there
is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the
“mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties.” State Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2004).
“Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative
under prevailing law.” Mosley v. City of
Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). A fact is material when it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
did not respond to Defendant's Statement of Material
Facts (Doc. 27), as required under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“FRCP”) 56 and Local Rule 4.01(E).
Like's status as a pro se prisoner does not
excuse him from responding to Defendants' Motion
“with specific factual support for his claims to avoid
summary judgment, ” or from complying with local rules.
Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001).
With his failure to respond, Like is deemed to have admitted
all of the facts in Defendants' statement of
uncontroverted facts. Turner v. Shinseki, No.
4:08-CV-1910 CAS, 2010 WL 2555114, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jun. 22,
2010) (citing Deichmann v. Boeing Co., 36 F.Supp.2d
1166, 1168 (E.D. Mo. 1999), aff'd 232 F.3d 907
(8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877).
judgment is not granted in favor of Defendants as a result of
Like's failure to properly respond to Defendants'
statement of material facts. Instead, the Court deems the
facts set forth by Defendants as true. Reasonover v. St.
Louis Cty., Mo., 447 F.3d 569, 579 (8th Cir. 2006).
Defendants must still establish that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See id.
was housed in Housing Unit 1 (“HU 1”) at SECC
from March 6, 2014, until November 19, 2015, which includes
all times relevant to Like's claims. HU 1 houses
offenders who have demonstrated the inability to adhere to
unit rules, which has resulted in long-term segregation
assignment; offenders who are assaultive towards staff or
other offenders; offenders who cannot control their behavior
due to mental health issues; or offenders who require single
cell assignments. Offenders are placed in HU 1 because they
pose the greatest threat to the safety and security of SECC.
The most restrictive property limits are placed on offenders
in HU 1 due to these safety and security threats. Offenders
in HU 1 are not permitted to have any property that could
pose a safety or security risk to themselves, other
offenders, or the staff at SECC.
Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”) 21-1.2 sets
the policy on which items of property are permitted for
offenders in HU 1. SECC SOP 21-1.2 states that offenders in
HU 1 are only permitted one bar of state-issued soap at a
time, to be distributed once per week. The non-state-issued
bars of soap available for purchase to offenders outside of
HU 1 are larger than the state-issued soap. The larger
non-state-issued bars of soap can create a safety and
security risk to those offenders in HU 1. Given the violent
nature of offenders, an offender could potentially hollow out
the soap in order to hide contraband, or potentially use the
large bar of soap as a weapon. The only reason an offender in
HU 1 would be permitted to possess non-state-issued soap
would be if he had written documentation indicating that he
could not use state-issued soap due to medical reasons.
received state-issued soap on a weekly basis during the
entirety of the relevant time period. If Like required more
soap in order to maintain good hygiene, and asked for it,
staff members at SECC were expressly permitted to supply him
with more soap. Like admits he never asked for additional
soap. Defendant Wigfall never received any communication from
Like, or any staff member, that Like requested more soap.
Wigfall never took any hygiene items away from Like.
Like's only medical lay-ins stated that he could purchase
soap from the Canteen, but did not state that he could not
use the state-issued soap. Like did not have any medical
documentation stating that he was ...