United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MICHAEL P. STEWART and SANDRA L. STEWART, Plaintiffs,
VILLAGE OF INNSBROOK, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the following motions:
Defendant Village of Innsbrook's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 14); Defendants Innsbrook Owners Association and
Innsbrook Corporation's Motion to Quash for Insufficient
Service of Process (Doc. No. 16); Defendant Charles
Boyce's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 19); and Defendant
Kevin Kuhlmann's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 24). The
motions are fully briefed and ready for
November 9, 2016, Plaintiffs Michael and Sandra Stewart
(“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against
Defendants Village of Innsbrook (“Village”),
Innsbrook Owners Association, Inc.
(“Association”), The Innsbrook Corporation
(“Corporation”), Charles Boyce
(“Boyce”), and Kevin Kuhlmann
(“Kuhlmann”), alleging violations of their
constitutionally protected property rights, inverse
condemnation, and interference with a contractual
relationship. Plaintiffs allege that on May 20, 2004, they
purchased Lot No. 897 of Innsbrook Estates from the
Corporation (Complaint (“Compl.”), Doc. No. 1 at
¶ 1) and then contracted with various entities (not
parties to this action) to purchase a modular home for their
lot (Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 25). Plaintiffs allege that
the Village issued Construction Permit No. 2104 for Lot No.
897 on May 23, 2007 (Compl. at ¶ 23). The first of the
four sections of the home was delivered to Plaintiffs'
Lot on or about October 2, 2007. (Compl. at ¶ 26)
Plaintiffs further allege that Boyce, Kuhlmann, and one Rick
Schmitt, refused to permit delivery of the remaining three
sections of the home to their Lot on October 2, 2007, based
on Village Ordinance No. 69 prohibiting modular homes.
(Compl. at ¶¶ 18, 27)
about October 15, 2007, Plaintiffs applied for a conditional
use permit from the Village in an effort to resolve the
delivery and installation issues. (Compl. at ¶ 32) They
allege that on December 18, 2007, they were granted a
conditional use permit that required them to satisfy various
conditions before the other three sections of the modular
home could be delivered to Lot No. 897. (Compl. at ¶ 37)
On April 21, 2008, the remaining three sections of the
modular home were delivered to Lot No. 897. (Compl. at ¶
40) After the exterior and interior of the modular home was
finished, an occupancy permit was issued on October 29, 2008.
(Compl. at ¶ 41) Plaintiffs allege that the sections of
the modular home were damaged due to the delay allegedly
caused by Defendants and, therefore, the sections of the
modular home could not be joined together properly during
assembly. (Compl. at ¶¶ 42-44) They claim they
eventually “lost the home” and were forced to
file for bankruptcy due to additional financing costs, legal
fees and construction costs, as well as a significant
reduction in the value of the home. (Compl. at ¶ 44)
Complaint asserts causes of action against: (1) Defendants
Village of Innsbrook and Village Administrator Kuhlmann for
the alleged violation of their constitutionally protected
property rights under § 1983 (Count I); (2) Defendants
Charles Boyce and Innsbrook Corporation for the alleged
violation of their constitutionally protected property rights
under § 1983 (Count II); (3) Defendant Village of
Innsbrook for inverse condemnation (Count III); and (4) all
Defendants for tortious interference with a contractual
relationship (Count IV).
their motions to dismiss, Defendants Boyce, Kuhlmann and the
Village argue that based on Plaintiffs' complaint, all of
the alleged actions taken by Defendants occurred in 2007 and
2008, more than five years before they filed this action on
November 9, 2016, and thus are time-barred. Defendant
Kuhlmann argues in the alternative that Plaintiffs' claim
against him as the Village Administrator for tortious
interference with a contractual relationship in Count IV is
barred by the three-year statute of limitations for causes of
action against government officials. The Association and the
Corporation move to quash service of process.
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all the
facts alleged in the complaint are true, and liberally
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801,
806 (8th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the
running of a statute of limitations, the Court may only grant
the motion if it is clear from the face of the complaint that
the cause of action is time-barred. Joyce v. Armstrong
Teasdale, LLP, 635 F.3d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 2011);
Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n. 2 (8th Cir.
2008); Smith v. UPS Freight, No. 4:15-CV-382 JAR,
2015 WL 4274594, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2015).
Statutes of limitation
RSMo. § 516.120
Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims accruing
within a particular state should be governed by that
state's statute of limitations governing personal injury
claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80
(1985). Recognizing Wilson, the Eighth Circuit has
held the statute of limitations for general personal injury
actions sounding in tort applies to suits for violation of
civil rights under § 1983. Kitchen v. Miller,
343 F.Supp.2d 820, 821-22 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (collecting cases).
Missouri imposes a five-year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. RSMo. § 516.120.4 (governing
“an action for … any other injury to the person
or rights of another”); see also Walker v.
Barrett, 650 F.3d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 2011) (the
statute of limitations for a § 1983 cause of action
arising in Missouri is five years); D'Arcy &
Associates, Inc. v. K.P.M.G. Peat Marwick, L.L.P., 129
S.W.3d 25, 29 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004) (the general statute of
limitations for asserting a cause of action for tortious
interference with a contractual relationship is five years).
RSMo. § 516.010
Missouri law, the statutory limitations period for an inverse
condemnation claim is ten years. RSMo. § 516.010;
Wyper v. Camden Cty., 160 S.W.3d 850, 853
(Mo.Ct.App. 2005); Shade v. Missouri Hwy. ...