Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Aames v. United States

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division

March 17, 2017

ANDREW B. AAMES, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendant.

          ORDER

          Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. United States District Judge.

         Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Jackson County, Missouri's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 4); the United States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 14); plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment against State of Missouri (Doc. # 19); State of Missouri's Motion for Leave to File Responsive Pleading Out of Time (Doc. # 24) and plaintiff's Motion for Order of Default (Doc. # 27).

         I. BACKGROUND

         On March 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a Complaint against the United States of America, the State of Missouri, Jackson County, Missouri and unnamed John Does 1 to 99. In his Complaint, plaintiff states that jurisdiction is based on a federal question - whether “specific sex-offender-related county ordinances are pre-empted by Federal law.” (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff also alleges that the Court has ancillary and pendant jurisdiction to decide whether the Jackson County ordinances are preempted by Missouri state law. Plaintiff is also asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging that his “continuing, lifelong, sex-offender registration requirements, as applied, are cruel, degrading, and unusual.” Plaintiff describes the actual dispute as follows:

Plaintiff Aames was convicted in 2008 of a sex-offense in California. Since that time, he has been required to register as a ‘sex-offender.' In November of 2014, he attempted to update his registration here in Jackson County, Missouri. He appeared on four consecutive days, but was sent away each time, allegedly to obtain further information, or documented proof of ‘online identifiers.' . . .On or about February 2, 2015, plaintiff was cited and charged with violating the two above-mentioned Jackson County local ordinances. One for failing to register in his birth month, the other for failing to obey an officer. He had an initial court date set for April first, last year, in Independence, Missouri. New charges were filed against Aames on or about March tenth, 2016, for alleged registration-related insufficiencies. He faces fines of up to two-thousand dollars, and incarceration of up to two years, under the county ordinances, or perhaps, more serious penalties, which are completely out-of-proportion to logical penalties for his original offer of a kiss to a fifteen year-old gal.

(Plaintiff's Complaint, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff then requests the following relief be granted by the Court: 1) declare the two Jackson County ordinances be stricken and declared illegal, void and contrary to law; 2) grant plaintiff relief from Mo.Rev.Stat. § 589.400, the Missouri sex-offender registration requirements; 3) declare that SORNA is unconstitutional because it is enacted in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; 4) declare that Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Megan's Law, Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking Law and the Campus Crimes Prevention Act are unconstitutional; 5) declare the Missouri sex offender registration statutes vague, ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, waste of time/money, unconstitutional, against public policy, violative of due process rights, equal protection rights and cruel and unusual punishment; 6) declare that the Missouri sex offender registration statutes violate the separation of powers clause and unduly infringe on the rights of the judiciary to determine outcomes of criminal cases; 7) declare that the federal sex-offender registration statutes violate the separation of powers clause and unduly infringe on the rights of the judiciary to determine outcomes of criminal cases; 8) declare that the Jackson County sex-offender related statutes are preempted by state law and 9) declare that the Jackson County sex offender registration statutes are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, burdensome, waste of time/money, unconstitutional, against public policy, violate due process rights, equal protection and constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

         In addition to his challenges to the sex offender laws, plaintiff is also seeking relief related to election laws. Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that if Senator Ted Cruz, Bernie Sanders or Ben Carson seek to place themselves on the November presidential ballot, that they must be listed by their legal names. Additionally, plaintiff is seeking a declaration that Ted Cruz is a natural born Cuban citizen.

         II. STANDARD

         To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” “shcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that merely pleads “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of the elements of a cause of action, or “naked assertions” devoid of “further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) we must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).

         In Driesen v. Smith, No. C13-4037-MWB, 2014 WL 24234 (N.D.Iowa Jan. 2, 2014), aff'd, 584 Fed.Appx. 292 (8th Cir. 2014), the Court explained the standards for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

A motion attacking the court's subject matter jurisdiction is governed by Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the complaint's claim of jurisdiction on its face or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction. . . . In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. . . . If the [defendant] wants to make a factual attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, the court may receive competent evidence such as affidavits, deposition testimony, and the like in order to determine the factual dispute.

Id. at * 6 (internal citations omitted).

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Sex Offender Registration Laws

         In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act., Pub.L. 109-248, Tit. I, 120 Stat. 590. Doe v. Keathley, 344 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Mo.App. 2011).

SORNA requires sex offenders to “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.” 42 U.S.C.§ 16913(a). Individuals subject to SORNA's registration requirements are identified in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1), which provides that “[t]he term ‘sex offender' means an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” A sex offense is defined as “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another, ” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i), or “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” 42 U.S.C.§ 16911(5)(A)(ii). A “specified offense against a minor includes “criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, ” 42 U.S.C.§ 16911(7)(H), and “any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I)(emphasis added).

James v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 505 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Mo.App. 2016). In enacting SORNA, Congress instructed states to pass legislation establishing their own sex offender registration systems and requiring sex offenders to register. Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act is known as “SORA.” This statute was originally enacted in 1994 and was later amended in 2006. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 589.400.1(7) provides that any person required to register under federal law, i.e., SORNA, must also register with the chief law officers of their county of residence in ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.