United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division
ANDREW B. AAMES, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendant.
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. United States District Judge.
pending before the Court is Defendant Jackson County,
Missouri's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 4); the United
States' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 14); plaintiff's
Motion for Default Judgment against State of Missouri (Doc. #
19); State of Missouri's Motion for Leave to File
Responsive Pleading Out of Time (Doc. # 24) and
plaintiff's Motion for Order of Default (Doc. # 27).
March 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a Complaint against the
United States of America, the State of Missouri, Jackson
County, Missouri and unnamed John Does 1 to 99. In his
Complaint, plaintiff states that jurisdiction is based on a
federal question - whether “specific
sex-offender-related county ordinances are pre-empted by
Federal law.” (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff also alleges that
the Court has ancillary and pendant jurisdiction to decide
whether the Jackson County ordinances are preempted by
Missouri state law. Plaintiff is also asserting a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim, alleging that his “continuing,
lifelong, sex-offender registration requirements, as applied,
are cruel, degrading, and unusual.” Plaintiff describes
the actual dispute as follows:
Plaintiff Aames was convicted in 2008 of a sex-offense in
California. Since that time, he has been required to register
as a ‘sex-offender.' In November of 2014, he
attempted to update his registration here in Jackson County,
Missouri. He appeared on four consecutive days, but was sent
away each time, allegedly to obtain further information, or
documented proof of ‘online identifiers.' . . .On
or about February 2, 2015, plaintiff was cited and charged
with violating the two above-mentioned Jackson County local
ordinances. One for failing to register in his birth month,
the other for failing to obey an officer. He had an initial
court date set for April first, last year, in Independence,
Missouri. New charges were filed against Aames on or about
March tenth, 2016, for alleged registration-related
insufficiencies. He faces fines of up to two-thousand
dollars, and incarceration of up to two years, under the
county ordinances, or perhaps, more serious penalties, which
are completely out-of-proportion to logical penalties for his
original offer of a kiss to a fifteen year-old gal.
(Plaintiff's Complaint, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff then requests
the following relief be granted by the Court: 1) declare the
two Jackson County ordinances be stricken and declared
illegal, void and contrary to law; 2) grant plaintiff relief
from Mo.Rev.Stat. § 589.400, the Missouri sex-offender
registration requirements; 3) declare that SORNA is
unconstitutional because it is enacted in violation of the
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; 4) declare that Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Megan's Law, Pam
Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking Law and the Campus Crimes
Prevention Act are unconstitutional; 5) declare the Missouri
sex offender registration statutes vague, ambiguous,
overbroad, burdensome, waste of time/money, unconstitutional,
against public policy, violative of due process rights, equal
protection rights and cruel and unusual punishment; 6)
declare that the Missouri sex offender registration statutes
violate the separation of powers clause and unduly infringe
on the rights of the judiciary to determine outcomes of
criminal cases; 7) declare that the federal sex-offender
registration statutes violate the separation of powers clause
and unduly infringe on the rights of the judiciary to
determine outcomes of criminal cases; 8) declare that the
Jackson County sex-offender related statutes are preempted by
state law and 9) declare that the Jackson County sex offender
registration statutes are vague, ambiguous, overbroad,
burdensome, waste of time/money, unconstitutional, against
public policy, violate due process rights, equal protection
and constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
addition to his challenges to the sex offender laws,
plaintiff is also seeking relief related to election laws.
Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that if Senator Ted Cruz,
Bernie Sanders or Ben Carson seek to place themselves on the
November presidential ballot, that they must be listed by
their legal names. Additionally, plaintiff is seeking a
declaration that Ted Cruz is a natural born Cuban citizen.
survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” “shcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that
merely pleads “labels and conclusions” or a
“formulaic recitation” of the elements of a cause
of action, or “naked assertions” devoid of
“further factual enhancement” will not suffice.
Id. (quoting Twombly). “Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 1950. Under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) we must accept the plaintiff's factual
allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff's favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d
1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).
Driesen v. Smith, No. C13-4037-MWB, 2014 WL 24234
(N.D.Iowa Jan. 2, 2014), aff'd, 584 Fed.Appx.
292 (8th Cir. 2014), the Court explained the
standards for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
A motion attacking the court's subject matter
jurisdiction is governed by Federal Rule Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the
complaint's claim of jurisdiction on its face or it can
attack the factual basis for jurisdiction. . . . In a facial
challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations
concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the
motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an
element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. . . . If
the [defendant] wants to make a factual attack on the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, the court may
receive competent evidence such as affidavits, deposition
testimony, and the like in order to determine the factual
Id. at * 6 (internal citations omitted).
Sex Offender Registration Laws
2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), as part of the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act., Pub.L. 109-248, Tit.
I, 120 Stat. 590. Doe v. Keathley, 344 S.W.3d 759,
762 (Mo.App. 2011).
SORNA requires sex offenders to “register, and keep the
registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender
resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the
offender is a student.” 42 U.S.C.§ 16913(a).
Individuals subject to SORNA's registration requirements
are identified in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1), which provides
that “[t]he term ‘sex offender' means an
individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” A sex
offense is defined as “a criminal offense that has an
element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with
another, ” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i), or “a
criminal offense that is a specified offense against a
minor.” 42 U.S.C.§ 16911(5)(A)(ii). A
“specified offense against a minor includes
“criminal sexual conduct involving a minor, ” 42
U.S.C.§ 16911(7)(H), and “any conduct
that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor.”
42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(I)(emphasis added).
James v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 505 S.W.3d
378, 381 (Mo.App. 2016). In enacting SORNA, Congress
instructed states to pass legislation establishing their own
sex offender registration systems and requiring sex offenders
to register. Missouri's Sex Offender Registration Act is
known as “SORA.” This statute was originally
enacted in 1994 and was later amended in 2006. Mo.Rev.Stat.
§ 589.400.1(7) provides that any person required to
register under federal law, i.e., SORNA, must also register
with the chief law officers of their county of residence in