Court of Appeals of Missouri, Western District, Fourth Division
KEVIN B. STRICKLAND, Appellant,
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.
from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The
Honorable Kevin D. Harrell, Judge
Mark D. Pfeiffer, Chief Judge, and Thomas H. Newton and Lisa
White Hardwick, Judges.
Pfeiffer, Chief Judge.
is now the appeal of his fifth post-conviction
relief ("PCR") motion, Mr. Kevin B. Strickland
("Strickland") appeals the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Jackson County ("motion court") denying
the 2015 version of Strickland's PCR motion. We affirm.
and Procedural Background
April 1979, Strickland was convicted of one count of capital
murder and two counts of second-degree murder. Strickland was
sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation or parole for fifty years on the capital murder
count, to be served concurrently with terms of ten years on
each second-degree murder count. Those convictions and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v.
Strickland, 609 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Mo. banc 1980).
14, 1983, Strickland timely filed a pro se PCR
motion ("original PCR motion" or "original PCR
claim") pursuant to Rule 27.26, which has since been
repealed and replaced by Rule 29.15. An amended original PCR
motion was later filed by appointed PCR counsel. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the motion court ("original motion
court") denied Strickland's original PCR motion on
September 11, 1985. That decision was affirmed by this Court
on appeal. Strickland v. State, 726 S.W.2d 341, 342
(Mo. App. W.D. 1987).
1987, Strickland has repeatedly filed a series of PCR motions
and claims, all of which have been rejected, in large part,
for the procedural infirmity Strickland's present PCR
motion suffers from. See Strickland v. State, 196
S.W.3d 648 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (untimely and successive
motion); Strickland v. State, 241 S.W.3d 456 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2007) (successive "Rule 27.26" motion);
Strickland v. State, 471 S.W.3d 373 (Mo. App. W.D.
2015) (denial of motion to reopen original PCR proceedings
due to alleged abandonment of counsel).
on December 3, 2015, Strickland filed a "new" PCR
motion with the motion court ("2015 PCR motion"),
in which Strickland is attempting to relitigate issues of
abandonment by post-conviction counsel, which Strickland has
already litigated unsuccessfully. See Strickland v.
State, 471 S.W.3d 373 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).
motion court summarily denied Strickland's 2015 PCR
motion, without findings of fact or conclusions of law, on
April 13, 2016. Strickland appeals.
substance of Strickland's 2015 PCR motion is nothing more
than an attempt to piecemeal allegedly "new"
arguments for "old" claims that have previously
been asserted by Strickland in his PCR motion odyssey that
has now spanned over two decades. In response, we refer
Strickland to our previous commentary to him on this
Successive and untimely motions are prohibited under Rule
29.15. Schleeper v. State, 982 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Mo.
banc 1998). "A motion is successive if it follows a
previous post-conviction relief motion addressing the same
conviction." Turpin v. State, 223 S.W.3d 175,
176 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007). Rule 29.15, therefore,
"implicitly bar[s] motions from persons, such as
appellant, who were sentenced before 1988 and have completed
one Rule 27.26 motion." Blankenship v. State,
783 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Mo. App. S.D. 1990) (internal quotation
omitted). "This is true even though the successive
motion alleges that the grounds stated therein were not
raised in a prior motion and were unknown to the
movant." Id. Furthermore, the claims asserted
by Appellant in his present Rule 27.26 motion are
substantially the same as the ones brought in his latest Rule