United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division
IAN POLLARD, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, LLC, et al. Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION (1) GRANTING PARTIES' JOINT
MOTION FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL, (2) CERTIFYING CLASSES
FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES, (3) APPROVING PLAINTIFFS'
SUPPLEMENTAL FEE APPLICATION, AND (4) DISMISSING MATTER WITH
D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
are the parties' Second Joint Motion for Final Settlement
Approval (Doc. #179) and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Fee
Application (Doc. #181). For the following reasons, the
parties' Joint Motion for Final Settlement Approval is
granted, and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Fee Application is
matter began in January 2013 with the filing of a putative
class action against Remington Arms Company, LLC, Sporting
Goods Properties, Inc., and E.I. Du Pont Nemours and Company.
Doc. #1. The Complaint alleges certain rifles
manufactured by Defendants since 1948 would fire unexpectedly
without a trigger pull, and made claims of unfair and
deceptive trade practices under Missouri statutes, breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraudulent concealment, and unjust
enrichment in connection with the Walker Fire Control
designed, manufactured, marketed, advertised, and sold by
moved to dismiss the Complaint. Doc. #40. The Court dismissed
Counts II (strict liability), III (negligence), IV (violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act), V (breach of express
warranty), and VI (breach of implied warranty of
merchantability). The Court also found that to the extent
Count I (violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices
Act) relied upon fraudulent misrepresentations or fraudulent
concealment, it must be dismissed. Doc. #40, at 5-8.
Complaint was later amended to include additional Plaintiffs
and seek relief in connection with “all Model 700, 721,
722, 725, Seven, Sportsman 78, 600, 660, 673, XP-100, 710,
715 and 720 firearms manufactured by Defendants that contain
trigger mechanisms utilizing a trigger connector, including
the patented Walker Fire Control, and all Model 700 and Seven
bolt-action rifles containing X-Mark Pro trigger mechanisms
that are subject to an April 2014 voluntary recall by
Defendants.” Doc. #90, ¶ 1. Among other things,
Plaintiffs asked that the Court require Defendants to repair
or replace their firearms. Id., Prayer for Relief.
According to the parties, approximately 7, 500, 000 of these
firearms have been sold in the United States. Doc. #180, at
engaging in extensive settlement negotiations, the parties
finalized the material terms of a nationwide settlement in
July 2014, and informed the Court they were in the process of
executing a comprehensive settlement agreement for all class
claims. Doc. #61; Doc. #220, at 18. In December 2014, the
parties filed their settlement agreement and sought
conditional certification of settlement classes, preliminary
approval of class action settlement, approval of their
proposed notice plan, appointment of class action settlement
administrator, and appointment of class counsel. Docs.
#67-68, 79-80. The proposed settlement provides benefits in
the form of retrofitted triggers, vouchers, and/or
reimbursements for replacing the firearm's original
trigger mechanism to owners residing in the United States of
certain Remington rifles manufactured from 1948 to the
present. Doc. #68-1, at 15. In exchange, class members would
release claims associated with the firearms, but retain the
right to bring claims for personal injury or property damage.
Doc. #68-1, at 13, 27. The parties' proposed notice plan
included (1) a joint press release; (2) direct notice; (3)
short form notice; (4) long form notice; (5) notice through
the settlement website; and (6) notice through social media
and the internet. Doc. #80, at 17-18, 38-39; Doc. #80-1, at
20-24; Doc. #80-3; Doc. #80-4; Doc. #80-5.
February 2015, the Court held a hearing on the parties'
joint motion. Doc. #84. The Court granted the parties'
joint motion and preliminarily approved the settlement,
conditionally certified the settlement classes, approved the
notice plan, appointed the class action settlement
administrator, and appointed class counsel. Doc. #88. The
Court directed all requests for exclusion from the settlement
and objections to the settlement be received by October 5,
2015. Id. at 6-8. The Court scheduled a final
approval hearing for December 14, 2015. Id. at 7.
2015, the parties executed the Court-approved notice plan.
Postcard notices were sent to approximately 2, 500
individuals who paid Remington for trigger replacements. Doc.
#92-9, at 6; Doc. #180-10, at 3. A notice about the
settlement was published in several magazines with a combined
circulation of more than 36 million. Doc. #92-9, at
Poster-sized notices were mailed to nearly 700 vendors known
to have mailed in Remington firearms on behalf of customers
seeking trigger replacements. Id. at 7. The joint
press release appeared on at least 225 websites, and reached
a potential audience of more than twenty-one million people.
Id. at 8. Internet banners, purportedly garnering
more than 970, 000 impressions,  were utilized, and some
Facebook advertising was implemented. Id. at 6-7. As
a result, 2, 327 claims were submitted. Id. at 9.
September 2015, the parties filed their joint motion for
final settlement approval, accompanied by, among other
things, the Second Amended Settlement Agreement,
claims forms, and declarations. Doc. #91. Plaintiffs also
filed their application for attorneys' fees. Doc. #93.
Objections to the settlement were timely filed by Terry
Pennington, Jack Belk, and Rodney Townsend. Docs. #96-98.
December 8, 2015, the Court issued an order cancelling the
final approval hearing, deferring consideration of the
parties' joint motion for settlement approval and
Plaintiffs' application for attorneys' fees, and
directing the parties to provide supplemental briefing. Doc.
#112. The Court's principal concern was “the low
number of claim forms that have been completed, ”
noting the claims rate was “quite low” given
several million firearms were potentially involved in the
class action settlement. Id. at 1. The Court ordered
the parties to develop a notice plan that “will be
effective and result in a more significant response
rate.” Id. The Court also directed the parties
to address additional concerns, including, most
significantly, the settlement agreement potentially waiving
personal injury claims. Id. at 2. The parties were
directed to file their supplemental briefing by January 15,
2016. Id. The Court later granted the parties three
extensions of time. Docs. #115, 124, 126.
10, 2016, the parties filed their supplemental brief in
response to the Court's December 8, 2015 Order. Doc.
#127. The supplemental briefing was accompanied by, among
other things, the parties' amended notice plan and the
Third Amended Settlement Agreement. Docs. #127-1 -
127-6. The Court scheduled a hearing on August 2,
2016, which the Court deemed a second preliminary approval
hearing. Doc. #128. Prior to the hearing on August 2, 2016,
Objectors Townsend and Pennington filed withdrawals of their
objections. Docs. #131, 132. Additionally, Todd Hilsee, who
represented himself as a “class action notice expert,
” submitted a letter expressing concerns with the
proposed settlement, particularly the proposed supplemental
notice plan. Doc. #134.
hearing was held on August 2, 2016. Docs. #136, 142. As of
the date of the hearing, more than 6, 500 claims were
submitted. Doc. #142, at 40-41. During the hearing, the
parties presented their proposed supplemental notice plan and
addressed the other concerns set forth in the Court's
December 8, 2015 Order. Doc. #142. During the hearing, the
Court also asked the parties to review the suggestions
contained in Hilsee's letter and consider potential
modifications to the proposed supplemental notice plan. Doc.
#142, at 51-54. After the hearing, the parties filed the
Fourth Amended Settlement Agreement. Doc. #138; see
also Doc. #180-1. The paragraphs that drew concerns from
the Court about potential waiver of personal injury were
August 23, 2016, the Court preliminarily approved the
settlement again. Doc. #140. The Court also approved the
parties' supplemental notice plan, which consisted of a
targeted social media campaign, targeted national radio
campaign, email and mail notification, and poster
notification. Id. at 2-3. The Court accepted the
parties' new claim forms, which removed language from the
initial claim forms indicating the claimant read and
acknowledged warnings. Id. at 3. The Court directed
the parties to place the claims forms in a particular order,
and instructed the parties to resend direct mail to the
settlement class members who previously received direct mail.
Id. at 3-4. The Court set November 18, 2016, as the
deadline to submit all exclusions from and objections to the
class action settlement, and scheduled a final approval
hearing for February 14, 2017. Id. at 4.
class members timely opted out of the settlement classes.
Doc. #210, at 6. The Court received timely objections to the
settlement from Jack Belk, Richard Barber, Lewis Frost, and
Richard Denney. Docs. #150, 157, 161. The Court also received
communications from Roger Stringer, David Wight, Paul Vigano,
and Kelly Edwards, as well as additional communications from
Barber expressing concerns about the settlement. Doc.
#147-49, 154, 160, 163-65, 167-71, 182, 192, 199,
September and October 2016, the parties executed the
Court-approved supplemental notice plan, which is discussed
in detail infra. As of January 13, 2017, 19, 425
claims were received. Doc. #180, at 27; Doc. #180-13, at 4.
Of the 19, 425 claims, 2, 666 firearms purportedly
experienced an accidental discharge. Doc. #180-13, at 4. Of
the 2, 666 claims with alleged accidental discharge, 788
individuals claimed personal injury or property damage.
January 17, 2017, a motion for leave to file the brief of
Amici Curiae Attorneys General (“amici
curiae”) in opposition to the proposed class
action settlement was filed. Doc. #176. The motion was
submitted by the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and on behalf of the Attorneys General of the
District of Columbia and the States of Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Washington. Id. After expediting briefing on the
motion for leave, the Court granted the motion, and the
amici brief was filed. Docs. #177, 190-191, 193,
194, 196. The parties were permitted to file responses to the
amici brief, and amici curiae filed a
reply. Docs. #201, 203, 208.
January 17, 2017, the parties filed their Second Joint Motion
for Final Settlement Approval, and Plaintiffs submitted their
Supplemental Fee Application. Docs. #179, 181. The final
approval hearing was held on February 14, 2017. Docs. #215,
220. During the hearing, the parties presented arguments in
favor of approving the settlement agreement. Doc. #220, at
7-52, 93-114. At the time of the hearing, 22, 000 claims had
been submitted. Id. at 23. Objectors Denney and
Frost, through their attorneys, and Objector Belk, appearing
on behalf of himself, argued against approval of the
settlement. Id. at 53-59, 66-92. On behalf of
amici curiae, Gary Klein from the Massachusetts
Attorney General's Office presented arguments against
approval of the settlement. Id. at 59-66. The Court
must now decide whether to approve the settlement.
Section A, the Court will address class certification,
including the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Section B, the Court
will determine whether the proposed settlement should be
approved. Therein, the Court will address objections raised
to the settlement, followed by its analysis of whether the
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. Finally, in
Sections C and D, the Court will consider Plaintiffs'
request for service awards to class representatives and
Plaintiffs' Application for Fees and Costs.
grant final certification of this litigation as a class
action, the Court must find the putative class action meets
the four requirements found in Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and fits within one of the
categories of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 613-14 (1997).
Rule 23(a) Requirements
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth four
prerequisites all class actions must satisfy:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at
satisfy the numerosity requirement, Plaintiffs must show the
class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members
would be impracticable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). The parties
represent to the Court, and no one has disputed, that
approximately 7, 500, 000 of the firearms at issue have been
sold in the United States. Doc. #180, at 17. Although number
of class members is uncertain - because a class member could
own more than one firearm or a firearm could have been
destroyed or owned by someone outside the United States - it
is apparent there are millions of potential class members.
Accordingly, the Court concludes this requirement has been
is satisfied when a “legal question linking the class
members is substantially related to the resolution of the
litigation.” DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64
F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1995). “Commonality is not
required on every question raised in a class action.”
Id.; see also Paxton v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting factual
variations do not necessarily deny class treatment when the
claims have a common thread).
lawsuit contains questions of law that link the class members
and are substantially related to the resolution of this
matter. Each class member shares a claim that his/her
firearm, which was manufactured by Defendants, is defective,
and his/her firearm's value and utility is decreased due
to the alleged defectiveness of the firearms. The class
members seek economic damages and equitable relief for buying
a firearm that is allegedly worth less than its purchase
price due to the alleged defect with the trigger mechanism.
The class members will not need to present evidence that
varies from member to member; the same evidence will suffice
for each individual to make a prima facie showing. Thus, the
Court finds this requirement has been satisfied.
typicality requirement is “fairly easily met so long as
the other class members have claims similar to the named
plaintiff.” DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1174. The named
plaintiffs' claims are typical to the class members'
claims because they all maintain Defendants manufactured
defective firearms, and as a result, they are entitled to an
economic recovery. The Court finds this requirement has been
Adequacy of Representation
23(a)(4) requires “the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). This requirement focuses
on “whether (1) the class representatives have common
interests with the members of the class, and (2) whether the
class representatives will vigorously prosecute the interests
of the class through qualified counsel.”
Paxton, 688 F.2d at 562-63 (citation omitted). This
adequacy inquiry also serves to uncover any conflicts of
interest between the named parties and the classes they seek
to represent. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (citation
class representatives stand in the same factual and legal
shoes of the absent settlement class members. They assert the
same claims and suffered the same injury as the absent
settlement class members. Id. at 625-26 (stating a
class representative must “possess the same interest
and suffer the same injury” as the absent class
members) (citation omitted). There are no apparent conflicts
of interests between the class representatives and settlement
class members or among individual settlement class members.
There is no indication any of the class representatives were
antagonistic to the other members of the classes or did not
vigorously pursue the claims. Therefore, the Court finds the
class representatives adequately represent the settlement
subclasses. The Court approves and appoints class
representatives as set forth in Appendix A.
the Court finds class counsel to be experienced, competent,
and qualified to prosecute this matter. The Court also finds
class counsel has fairly and adequately represented and
protected the interests of the settlement class
members.The Court appoints Richard Arsenault,
Charles Schaffer, Eric Holland, and W. Mark Lanier as class
counsel for the settlement classes. The Court concludes the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) have been met.
Rule 23(b) Requirement
addition to satisfying the Rule 23(a) prerequisites,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate their claims qualify under one of
the three subparts of Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The parties contend they have met the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Doc. #180, at 51. This subpart
is satisfied if “the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3).
Predominance of Common Issues of Law and Fact
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521
U.S. at 623; see also Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400
F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005). “[T]he court must look
only so far as to determine whether, given the factual
setting of the case, if the plaintiffs['] general
allegations are true, common evidence could suffice to make
out a prima facie case for the class.” Blades,
400 F.3d. at 566.
matter, common questions predominate over any issues
individuals within the settlement classes may have. First,
class members' claims relate to the design, manufacture,
marketing, and sale of allegedly defective firearms. Second,
class members seek the same relief - economic damages and
equitable relief for buying a firearm that is alleged to be
worth less than its purchase price due to the alleged defect
with the trigger mechanism. Third, the question of whether
the firearms are indeed defective and the evidence to
establish said defect would be the same for each class
member. If each class member were to bring an individual
claim, each class member would have to demonstrate the same
defect to prove liability. The nature and scope of the common
questions in this matter satisfy the predominance
requirements. The Court finds that common issues of fact and
law predominate here.
Superiority of Class Action
action settlement is the superior method for resolving the
disputes in this matter in a fair and effective manner.
First, the settlement provides concrete, substantial remedies
to individuals, many of whom, due to applicable statutes of
limitations, may not otherwise be entitled to any relief.
Second, the settlement of the class members' claims
avoids duplicative litigation, saving Plaintiffs and
Defendants from expending resources to adjudicate common
legal and factual issues. Because individuals were permitted
to opt-out of this settlement, those individuals who timely
filed exclusions and desire to prosecute their claims on
their own may do so. Accordingly, the Court concludes the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) have been satisfied. Pursuant
to the Court's finding that the settlement classes
satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the settlement classes are approved and
finally certified for settlement purposes. The settlement
classes are defined in Appendix A. The Court finds the
following class members submitted valid requests for
exclusion from the settlement: Vincent Agnelli Jr., Leon
Baily, Mike Blair, Carol Bonham, Leonard Bonham, David Harris
Jr., John Hoober, Ronson Ibarra, Brad Sisneros, Timothy
Tomlinson, and David Wight. Doc. #210, at 6. These
individuals' rights are not affected by the settlement,
and they shall not receive any benefits from the settlement.
Approval of Settlement
approve this class action settlement, the Court must find the
settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed.R.Civ.P.
23(e)(2); see In re Uponor, Inc., F1807 Plumbing Fittings
Prods. Liab. Litig., 716 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir.
2013). Before turning to this particular analysis, the Court
will address objections to the settlement.
Objections to Settlement
Objections to the settlement concern the following issues:
(a) adequacy of notice; (b) fairness to class members; (c)
adequacy of relief; (d) claims process and claims period; (e)
release; and (f) differences among state laws.
Adequacy of Notice
objections to the settlement question the adequacy of notice
to class members. See Docs. #150, 161, 196. Rule
23(c)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
class members receive “the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B).
“Notice of a settlement proposal need only be as
directed by the district court…and reasonable enough
to satisfy due process.” DeBoer, 64 F.3d at
1176 (citations omitted). The notice must also “clearly
and concisely state in plain, easily understood
language” the following: (i) nature of the action; (ii)
definition of the class certified; (iii) the class claims;
(iv) a class member may enter an appearance through an
attorney if so desired; (v) the court will exclude from the
class those members who request exclusion; (vi) time and
manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) binding effect of
a class judgment on members. Fed.R.Civ.P.
Supplemental Notice Plan
the parties' initial notice plan resulted in an appalling
claims rate, the Court required the parties to propose a
supplemental notice plan. Doc. #112. Over the course of six
months, the parties negotiated, tested, and ultimately
proposed their supplemental notice plan. Doc. #127. The Court
approved the proposed supplemental notice plan (Doc. #140),
and it was administered in September and October
2016.The supplemental notice plan utilized
four avenues to reach class members.
the parties ran a targeted social media campaign, which
consisted of advertisements on Facebook. The targeted social
media campaign, when fully executed, ran for four weeks,
reached more than four million individuals, and the
advertisements were clicked more than 375, 000 times. Doc.
#180, at 33.
the parties implemented a national radio campaign. Sixty
second advertisements ran over the course of four weeks
during peak morning and evening drive times, and targeted key
states/regions, key demographics of potential class members,
hunting and fishing programs, and programs with a strong
sportsmen audience. Doc. #180, at 33. Additionally, the
advertisements were streamed on iHeartRadio, a digital
streaming service. Id. More than 29, 000 radio spots
ran on more than 3, 500 radio stations, covering 98% of the
United States market and generating more than 55, 000, 000
gross impressions. Id.; Doc. #178, at 5.
Remington compiled physical mailing addresses and email
addresses from various sources, including customers who
signed up for email notifications on the company's
website, individuals who signed up for email notifications at
trade shows, warranty registrations for all firearms,
individuals who had firearms repaired by Remington, and
individuals who contacted Remington's customer service
number. Doc. #180, at 34; Doc. #180-10, at 3-4. The
compilation was over-inclusive in that it included, for
example, physical and email addresses for individuals who
registered warranties for other firearms or had repairs
performed on other firearms. Doc. #142, at 21-22; Doc. #180,
at 34; Doc. #180-10, at 3-4. Ultimately, notices about the
proposed settlement were sent to more than one million email
addresses, and postcards were mailed to more than 93, 000
physical addresses. If an email bounced back, a postcard was
mailed to the individual if a physical address could be
located. Doc. #180, at 34; Doc. #180-10, at 5. If a postcard
was returned, a new postcard was mailed if a new mailing
address could be located. Doc. #180, at 34; Doc. #180-10, at
Remington disseminated an informational poster in PDF format.
Doc. #180, at 34. The poster was emailed to Remington's
twelve wholesale accounts and seven retail accounts, and
those accounts were instructed to send the posters to 5, 000
independent retailers and 6, 000 retail stores for display.
Id. at 34-36.
result of this four-pronged supplemental notice campaign, the
claims rate increased to 19, 425 claims (as of January 13,
2017) and 22, 000 (as of February 13, 2017). Doc. #180, at
35; Doc. #220, at 23. The settlement website has been visited
more than 500, 000 times. Doc. #220, at 23.
notices both in the initial notice plan and the supplemental
notice plan clearly and concisely stated in easily understood
language what the nature of this action was, what the claims
were, the definitions of the classes conditionally certified,
and the binding effect of a judgment. The notices set forth
the deadlines for exclusions and objections, and the manner
in which those exclusions and objections must be submitted.
No objections to these particular requirements were lodged.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Rules 23(c)(2)(B)(i)
through (vi) have been satisfied.
Best Notice Practicable
more complicated question, which is raised by Objectors, is
whether, under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), the notice provided was best
notice “practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B).
The objections to the notice can be broken down into the
following categories: (a) identification of class members;
(b) method of notice; (c) reach of and response to notice;
and (d) content of notice.
Identification of Class Members
Frost and Denney, who adopted the opinions contained in the
letter previously submitted by Hilsee, argue the parties did
not use reasonable efforts to identify class members who are
easily identifiable. Doc. #150, at 16, 20-21, 26-27. However,
Remington, unlike other manufacturers, does not sell to the
public or directly to individuals. Doc. #220, at 34.
Remington does not possess a customer list with contact
information. Remington's communications with firearm
owners are limited to those individuals who submit warranty
cards, those who have a firearm repaired by Remington or an
authorized Remington repair facility, those who sign up to
receive email notifications from Remington, and those who
have communicated with Remington's customer service line.
Doc. #180, at 34; Doc. #180-10, at 3-4. Other than firearms
indicated on warranty cards or on repair documents, Remington
does not know what firearm is owned by the individual.
Consequently, Remington does not possess a compilation of
names and contact information for owners of Remington
firearms.Much of the information Remington has is
warranty registration (some decades old), which could be
outdated given that individuals move and change email
addresses. Remington obtains email addresses from individuals
who contact it through its website, at trade shows, for
repairs, or through its customer service department.
Remington routinely communicates with these individuals via
email. Doc. #220, at 35.
argue the parties should have obtained the National Rifle
Association's (“NRA”) mailing list or should
have partnered with the NRA to send notice of the settlement
to NRA members. Doc. #150, at 27. The parties attempted to
obtain the NRA's mailing list or membership list, but the
NRA would not provide the addresses to Remington because
Remington is not an NRA Affinity Partner. Doc. #220, at 103.
Additionally, it is doubtful a membership or mailing list
from the NRA would identify what firearms the recipients
possessed. Thus, obtaining such a list would not allow the
parties to identify potential class members.
Frost and Denney, as well as amici curiae, also
maintain the parties should have obtained state hunting
license records. Doc. #150, at 27; Doc. #196, at 25; Doc.
#220, at 72-73. But Objectors do not set forth if these
records are attainable, the mechanisms the parties must
utilize to obtain the records, the costs associated with
obtaining these records, and whether the parties would be
required to file suit in every state to attain these records.
Objectors' argument also calls into question whether an
individual could prevent the dissemination of his or her
license information. And even if the parties could obtain
these records, in all likelihood, the records would not
identify the firearm utilized by the licensee, which is the