United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff
Adrian Carr, an inmate at the Medium Security Institution in
St. Louis, for leave to commence this action without
prepayment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated
below, the Court will grant the motion and assess an initial
partial filing fee of $31.45. In addition, the Court will
dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must
assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of twenty percent of the greater of (1) the
average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or
(2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account
for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial
partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's
income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner
will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court
each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds
$10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted a
“Resident Funds Inquiry” form showing an average
monthly balance of $157.23 during the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint. The Court will
therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $31.45,
which is twenty percent of his average monthly balance.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court shall dismiss a
complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it
“lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989);
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A
complaint fails to state a claim if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted requires a two-step inquiry. First, the Court
must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include
“legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are]
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id.
at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the
complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id.
at 1950-51. This is a “context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. The
plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the
“mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1950. The Court must review the factual
allegations in the complaint “to determine if they
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”
Id. at 1951.
pleadings are liberally construed, and are held to a less
stringent standard when considering a dismissal of the case
for failure to state a claim. See Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d
209, 211 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1984). Even so, a pro se complaint
must contain specific facts to support its conclusions.
Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1183 (8th Cir.
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violation of his constitutional rights and his
rights guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution. Named as
defendant is Jennifer Joyce, the Circuit Attorney for the
City of Saint Louis. Plaintiff alleges that the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department illegally searched his home.
Plaintiff also alleges that Joyce denied his rights to a fair
and impartial trial and a speedy trial, and wrongfully failed
to disclose certain discovery pursuant to Missouri Supreme
Court Rules 25.03A(1) and 25.03A(9). Plaintiff also alleges
that the Missouri State Public Defender System provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. The remainder of
plaintiff's complaint consists of rambling paragraphs
concerning the general conditions of the institution in which
he is incarcerated, including the pricing of commissary
items, smells coming in through the windows due to the
location of the institution, the lack of chicken, beets and
fish to eat, poor medical care, the lack of a law library,
and poor electrical service.
relief, plaintiff states: “I would like for the
prosecutor (Circuit Attorney) Jennifer Joyce to be delt
[sic] with accordingly.” (Docket No. 1 at 9).
Plaintiff also seeks $7, 000, 000.00 in damages.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed to provide a “broad
remedy for violations of federally protected civil
rights.” Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). However, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 provides no substantive rights; it merely
provides a remedy for violations of all “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws [of the United States].” 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 “merely provides a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”)
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) the violation of a right secured by the