United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD WEBBER SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Redflex Traffic
Systems, Inc.'s Supplemental Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings [ECF No. 55] and Redflex Traffic Systems,
Inc.'s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Untimely
Memorandum [ECF No. 64].
Jacob Blair and Sarah Blair (“Plaintiffs”) filed
a Class Action Complaint in this Court on August 25, 2015,
against Defendants City of Hannibal (“Hannibal”),
Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. (“Redflex”) and
Does 1 through 24 alleging Hannibal's red light camera
program is unconstitutional [ECF No. 1]. On November 16,
2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint against
Defendants asserting the following eight counts: (1)
Declaratory Judgment and Injunction pursuant to Missouri
Revised Statute § 527.010 et seq; (2) Violation
of Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article I § 10 of the Missouri Constitution; (3) Unjust
Enrichment, (4) Abuse of Process; (5) Civil Conspiracy; (6)
Aiding and Abetting against Redflex; (7) Damages for
Violation of Missouri Revised Statute § 484.010, et
seq, against Redflex; and (8) Money Had and Received
[ECF No. 16]. Counts II through VIII against Redflex, and all
counts against Hannibal were dismissed when the Court granted
previous motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Defendants. Currently pending before the Court is
Redflex's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings seeking to
dismiss Count I.
Court adopts the following statement of facts as well-pleaded
allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint [ECF No. 16].
Ginsburg v. Inbev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 1229, 1233 n.3
(8th Cir. 2010); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009). On or about May 18, 2007, Hannibal and Redflex
entered into a contract for Redflex to install and operate a
red light camera system in Hannibal. In December 2011,
Plaintiff Joseph Blair received a ticket as a result of the
red light camera system, was issued a fine, and paid the
fine. At the end of 2012, or beginning of 2013, Plaintiff
Sarah Blair received a ticket as a result of the red light
camera system, was issued a fine, and paid the fine.
Defendants shared revenue of approximately $500, 000 annually
since 2007, a sum greater than the cost of the program.
played an integral role in the program including advising
Hannibal about the program, analyzing and making judgments
regarding whether a violation occurred, sending notices of
violations, collecting fines, and providing a customer
service line. Redflex advised persons who had received
notices of violation to pay the fine. Redflex and its paid
employees are not attorneys licensed in the State of
19, 2007, the Hannibal City Council passed Ordinance 4412
which allowed for detection of violations of traffic control
ordinances through an automated red light enforcement
system. On March 6, 2012, the Hannibal City
Council revoked Ordinance 4412 and replaced it with Ordinance
4599 which governed the use of the automated red light
enforcement system. On November 12, 2013, Hannibal City
Council revoked Ordinance 4599 and replaced it with Ordinance
4652 to govern the use of the automated red light enforcement
Count I, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment against
Redflex concerning the following: (1) whether the ordinance
is void because it conflicts with Missouri state law; (2)
whether Hannibal had authority to enact the ordinance; (3)
whether Defendants circumvented Missouri state laws mandating
the assessment of points for moving violations; (4) whether
Defendants have authority to reclassify violations of red
light traffic signals as non-moving infractions; (5) whether
it is lawful for Hannibal to create a rule of evidence in the
ordinance by establishing liability based on vehicle
ownership; (6) whether Defendants can lawfully prosecute
vehicle owners if the owner was not driving at the time of
the violation; (7) whether the ordinance or Defendants'
conduct violates the Missouri Constitution or the United
States Constitution when compelling the accused to testify to
prove their innocence; (8) whether the ordinance or
Defendants' conduct violates the Missouri Constitution or
United States Constitution by depriving Plaintiffs of due
process of law; (9) whether the ordinance is invalid because
it is for the purpose of generating revenue; (10) whether the
ordinance or Defendants' conduct violates public policy;
(11) whether the continuous monitoring by the program
constitutes an unreasonable search made without probable
cause; and (12) whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
the fine payments made pursuant to the void ordinance.
a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed
under the same standard as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Ginsburg, 623 F.3d at 1233, n. 3; Clemons v.
Crawford, 585 F .3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2009);
Ashley County v. Pfizer, 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir.
2009). The Court must view the allegations in the Complaint
liberally and in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th
Cir. 2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto. Servs,, 432
F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005)). The Court “must accept
the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039
(8th Cir. 2005). A complaint must have “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(abrogating the “no set of facts” standard for
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). To prove the grounds for entitlement
of relief, a plaintiff must provide more than labels and
conclusions, and “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555; Huang v. Gateway Hotel
Holdings, 520 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1140 (E.D.Mo. 2007).
Court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings,
but it may consider ‘some materials that are part of
the public record or do not contradict the
complaint.'” State ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur
D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, the Court may consider materials that are
“necessarily embraced by the pleadings.”
Piper Jaffray Cos. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
967 F.Supp. 1148, 1152 (D.Minn. 1997); Porous Media Corp.
v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).
asserts Count I must be dismissed because Plaintiffs'
opportunity to appear in municipal court and challenge
Hannibal's ordinance and procedures provides a complete,
adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs argue there was never an
opportunity to dispute Redflex's involvement at a
municipal hearing because Redflex would not have been a party
to the hearing.
to Count I is Plaintiffs' request Hannibal's
ordinance be declared void and unenforceable. For Plaintiffs
to get the relief they request in each part of Count I, the
Court must find the ordinance void. However, Hannibal, the
party who created the ordinance and is charged with enforcing
the ordinance, is no longer a party to the case. Therefore,
the issue before the Court is not whether there is an
adequate remedy at law but rather, whether the Court can