United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division
ORDER AND OPINION (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND (2) GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
are cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff STIM,
LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #125) is
denied, and Defendant AECOM, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. #122) is granted in part and denied in part.
March 31, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Consulting
Agreement. Under the Consulting Agreement, Plaintiff was
supposed to identify tax incentives for Defendant. Defendant,
in turn, would compensate Plaintiff for those services. For
several months, Plaintiff worked to identify tax incentives
for Defendant. In September 2014, Defendant terminated the
subsequently filed suit against Defendant. On April 1, 2016,
the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss. Doc. #66. Specifically, the Court
dismissed Plaintiff's claims for Declaratory Judgment
(Count IV), and violation of the Missouri Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (Count VI). Plaintiff and Defendant have now
filed cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff seeks
summary judgment on his claim of Breach of Contract (Count
I). Doc. #125. Defendant seeks summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff's remaining claims: (1) Breach of Contract
(Count I), (2) Quantum Meruit (Count II), (3) Unjust
Enrichment (Count III), Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Count
V), and violation of California Unfair Competition Law (Count
VII). Doc. #122.
moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only
if there is a showing that “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Williams v.
City of St. Louis, 783 F.2d 114, 115 (8th Cir. 1986).
“[W]hile the materiality determination rests on the
substantive law, it is the substantive law's
identification of which facts are critical and which facts
are irrelevant that governs.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus,
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Wierman v.
Casey's Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir.
2011) (quotation omitted). In applying this standard, the
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, giving that party the benefit of all
inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986); Tyler v. Harper, 744
F.2d 653, 655 (8th Cir. 1984). However, a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the…pleadings, but…by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
presents a claim for breach of contract in Count I. Doc. #1,
at 30. The Court finds genuine issues of material fact exist
as to this claim. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment. The Court also denies
Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim
for the same reason.
COUNTS II AND III
presents claims for quantum meruit in Count II, and unjust
enrichment in Count III. Doc. #1, at 32. Defendant maintains
these claims are precluded by the express contract at issue
in this case. Doc. #123, at 38-39. Plaintiff indicates the
Court may regard these claims as foreclosed by the existence
of an express contract at issue. Doc. #140, at 19. The
existence of an express contract precludes recovery under
equitable theories such as quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment. E.g., Lowe v. Hill, 430 S.W.3d
346, 349 (Mo.Ct.App. 2014) (citations omitted); Topchian
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 854 (8th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (applying Missouri law).
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of
Defendant on Count II and Count III.
presents a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation in Count V.
Doc. #1, at 33. To prevail on a fraudulent misrepresentation
claim under Missouri law, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a
representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its
truth; (5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted
on by the person in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6)
the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the
representation; (7) the hearer's reliance on the
representation being true; (8) the hearer's right ...