Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Thompson v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

November 1, 2016

GINA THOMPSON and KAREN MCCABE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          RONNIE L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

         This matter is before the Court on Defendant Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.'s ("Redflex") Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 17), Supplemental Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 60), and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62). The motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.

         I. Background

         The Court stated the background of this case in its Memorandum and Order of October 24, 2016 granting the Defendant City of St. Peters' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court incorporates by reference those facts as if set forth herein. (ECF No. 92) Specific to Redflex, Plaintiffs assert claims for Declaratory Judgment (Count I); Unjust Enrichment (Count V); Abuse of Process (Count VI); Damages for Violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 484.010, et seq. (Count VII); and Money Had and Received (Counts VIII and IX).

         In 2006, Defendants Redflex and St. Peters worked together to implement and operate an automated program that enforced traffic regulations. (Compl. ¶ 31, ECF No. 4) St. Peters and Redflex entered into an Agreement on July 5, 2006 wherein Defendant Redflex would provide certain equipment, processes, and back office services ("Redflex System") so that sworn police officers could monitor, identify, and enforce red light running violations.[1] (Def. Redflex's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings Ex. A p. 1, ECF No. 18-1) Section 3 of the Agreement entitled "Services" provided for the construction, installation, and maintenance of the Redflex System. (Def. Redflex's Ex. A p. 7) In addition, the Agreement provided that all violations data would be stored on the Redflex System and processed into a format capable for review by an Authorized Officer, who would then determine whether a citation should be issued. (Id.) The Agreement specified that the decision to issue a citation was "the sole, unilateral and exclusive decision of the authorized officer." (Id.) Exhibit D to the Agreement provided that St. Peters would pay Redflex a certain fee per citation. (Id. at p. 27)

         On June 8, 2006, the City of St. Peters adopted Ordinance No. 4536, entitled "Automated Enforcement of Traffic Control Signal Regulations." (Compl. ¶ 32; Def. Redflex's Ex. A, 2006 Ordinance, ECF. No. 61-1) On November 7, 2013, the City replaced the 2006 Ordinance and adopted Ordinance No. 6014 entitled "Automated Photo Enforcement of Traffic Regulations." (Compl. ¶ 53; Def Redflex's Ex. B, 2013 Ordinance, ECF No. 61-2) These Ordinances governed the use of the Redflex System.

         Plaintiffs assert in their Complaint that Defendant Redflex "plays an integral role in prosecuting violations, processing citations, and collecting fines." (Compl. ¶ 85a) Further, Plaintiffs maintain that Redflex encourages guilty pleas and payment of the fine, as well as provides a toll-free customer service line. (Id. at ¶¶ 85c, 86-87) In response to the Complaint, Defendant Redflex has filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, a Supplemental Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

         II. Legal Standards

         A. Judgment on the Pleadings

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Courts review motions for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). demons v. Crawford, 585 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation omitted). When deciding such a motion, the court accepts "all facts pled by the nonmoving party as true and draws all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmovant." Waldron v. Boeing Co., 388 F.3d 591, 593 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A complaint must be dismissed if the complaint fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Id. at 555. "[A] plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his ' entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is '"appropriate only when there is no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashley Cty, Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009)).

         "When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings . . ., the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings . . . ." Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). However, courts "may consider materials that necessarily are embraced by the pleadings or that are part of the public record and do not contradict the complaint." Mickelson v. Cty. of Ramsey, 823 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Porous Media, 186 F.3d at 1079).

         B. Summary Judgment

         Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1995).

         The moving party has the initial burden to establish the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its favor. City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. AssociatedElec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). Once this burden is discharged, if the record does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 771 U.S. 242, 249(1986).

         When the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ .P. 56(e). The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In fact, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party which would enable a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

         III. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.