United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
JERRY D. FRANKLIN, Petitioner,
CHRIS KOSTER, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on respondent's motion to
alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). The petitioner has not filed a response, and
the time allowed for doing so has expired.
29, 2010, Jerry Franklin pled guilty in the Twenty-Second
Circuit Court of Missouri (City of St. Louis) to two counts
of first degree assault on a law enforcement officer, in
violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.081. See State v.
Franklin, No. 0922-CR05755-01; Resp. Ex. A. He was
sentenced on that same day to two 18-year terms of
imprisonment that were to run concurrently with each other
and with a previously-imposed 216-month federal sentence for
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Resp. Ex. A at 2.
23, 2011, Franklin filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court
conditionally granted Franklin's petition on the grounds
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by reason
of his attorney's failure to file a direct appeal of the
state court judgment as instructed. [Doc. #46].
Respondent now moves to alter or amend pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). [Doc. #48].
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) clarifies the power of district
courts to correct their own mistakes in the time period
immediately following entry of judgment. Norman v. Ark.
Dep't of Educ., 79 F.3d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing White v. N.H. Dep't of Emp't Sec.,
455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). The rule affords district courts
“broad discretion” to alter or amend a judgment.
United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440
F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006).
59(e) motions “serve the limited function of correcting
‘manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.'” Id. (quoting
Innovative Home Health Care v. P.T.-O.T. Assoc. of the
Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Relief is only available when a manifest error “affects
the correctness of the judgment.” Norman, 79
F.3d at 750 (internal quotations omitted).
a party should not use the motion to “introduce new
evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which
could have been offered or raised prior to entry of
judgment.” Innovative Home Health Care, 141
F.3d at 1286. This rule applies with equal force in the
habeas context - a Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to raise
new arguments that could have been asserted prior to final
judgment. See, e.g., Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476
(8th Cir. 1996).
argues that the Court should grant its Rule 59(e) motion
because (1) the Court erroneously determined that Franklin
showed cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default, (2)
Franklin did not adequately plead an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, (3) the Court should have held an
evidentiary hearing as “Franklin, his documents, and
his affiants are not credible, ” and (4) the state
circuit court's decision did not involve an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law. [Doc. #48].
regard to the Court's findings of cause and prejudice,
respondent disputes the Court's interpretation and
application of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309
(2012). The Court has reviewed respondent's arguments and
finds no error in its previous ruling. Further, the
Court previously analyzed and rejected each of the
respondent's remaining arguments. [Doc. #46 at 15, 22-23
(addressing the state circuit court's application of
federal law); id. at 16-23 (evaluating the factual
sufficiency of petitioner's claims); id. at
25-26 (rejecting the need for an evidentiary hearing)].
also filed new evidence in support of the Rule 59(e) motion.
This new evidence consists of defense counsels'
affidavits, disputing petitioner's assertion that he
directed them to appeal the state court judgment. [Doc. #50].
But, respondent makes no showing that “(1) this
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the movant exercised
due diligence to discover the evidence before the end of
trial; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative
or impeaching; and (4) a new trial considering the evidence
would probably produce a different result.” United
States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist, 440 F.3d 930, 933
(8th Cir. 2006).
Court finds that the arguments and evidence respondent
presents in the instant Rule 59(e) motion have or could have
been raised prior to entry of judgment. The respondent will
not be afforded a “second bite at the apple.”
Id. at 936. Moreover, respondent has not shown any