United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CRITES-LEONI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
action is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. 7.)
cause was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Scott
County, Missouri, and was removed to this court pursuant to
the Court's federal question jurisdiction. In Count I of
the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on sex
in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000(e), Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In Count II, Plaintiff reincorporates the
allegations of Count I, but does not explicitly state any
theory of liability.
moved to dismiss Count II on the basis that Plaintiff's
claim for sex discrimination is solely viable pursuant to the
Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), and Plaintiff
did not comply with the filing requirements of the MHRA.
Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not file
a Charge of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights (“MCHR”) within 180 days of the date
of the alleged discrimination. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff does not, therefore, have a viable cause of action
under Missouri law.
has not filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss. At the Rule 16 Conference held on August 2, 2016,
Plaintiff's counsel indicated to the Court that he
conceded to the dismissal of Count II.
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint
so as to eliminate those actions “which are fatally
flawed in their legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby
sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and
trial activity.” Young v. City of St. Charles,
244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)). A complaint must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not
plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 (2007). A petitioner need not
provide specific facts to support his allegations,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per
curiam), but “must include sufficient factual
information to provide the grounds on which the claim rests,
and to raise a right to relief above a speculative
level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp.,
517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 222 (2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555-56 & n. 3).
ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the
allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to
the petitioner. Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319
F.3d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 2003). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a claim must be facially plausible, meaning that
the factual content ... allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the respondent is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Cole v. Homier Dist. Co.,
Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). When
determining the facial plausibility of a claim, the Court
must “accept the allegations contained in the complaint
as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Coons v.
Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)).
Missouri law, employment discrimination claims based on sex
are governed by the MHRA. See Noel v. AT&T
Corp., 936 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (citing
Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C., 304
S.W.3d 81, 95-96 (Mo. banc 2010). The MHRA requires that a
claimant exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge
of discrimination within 180 days after “the alleged
act of discrimination.” See Mo.Rev.Stat.
§ 213.075(1). Failure to satisfy this exhaustion
requirement bars the claim. Gipson v. KAS Snacktime
Co., 83 F.3d 225 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hill v.
John Chezik Imports, 797 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Mo. App.
alleges that she suffered acts of discrimination between May
2, 2014, and July 6, 2014. (Doc. 1-1 at 9.) It is undisputed
that Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination on February
11, 2015, 221 days following the last date of the alleged
discrimination. Id. Consequently, her MHRA claim is
time-barred, and Count II will be dismissed.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc.
7) is granted.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count II of Plaintiff's