United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
ARTHUR A. BLUMEYER, III Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
C. HAMILTON DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Arthur Blumeyer's Petition
for Writ of Error Coram Nobis. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) The
Government has filed a Response (ECF No. 8), and the Petition
is ready for disposition.
February 1996, Blumeyer was convicted of mail fraud, wire
fraud, conspiracy to do the same, and money laundering. The
Court sentenced Blumeyer to 262 months in prison, and his
conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. United
States v. Blumeyer, 114 F.3d 758, 771 (8th Cir. 1997).
In 1998, Blumeyer filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Blumeyer v. United
States, No. 4:98-cv-00301-JCH (E.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 1998).
His motion for post-conviction relief was denied, and the
Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.
Blumeyer v. United States, No. 01-2404 (8th Cir.
Aug. 27, 2001). Blumeyer proceeded to file several
unauthorized successive motions for post-conviction relief in
the Eastern District of Missouri, all of which were
also filed applications in other districts seeking collateral
relief. In December 2011, Blumeyer filed a 28 U.S.C. §
2241 petition in the Southern District of Illinois. Upon
retaining counsel, he filed an amended section 2241 petition,
in which he raised the following issues: (1) whether his
money laundering convictions must be vacated in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008); (2) whether his theft of
honest services conviction must be vacated in light of
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), and
Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465
(2010); and (3) “whether [he] may advance
and prevail on an actual innocence claim in light of these
decisions.” (ECF No. 10 in No. 3:11-cv-01137 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 22, 2012).)
Southern District of Illinois denied Blumeyer's section
2241 petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning as
Even if laches should not apply, Blumeyer's
Santos argument must be denied because he does not
have a viable claim of actual innocence; that is, even under
Santos he is guilty of money laundering: The money
Blumeyer took in and then sent overseas to be
‘laundered' was the proceeds of selling fraudulent
insurance. That money did not go to operating expenses; it
went to Blumeyer's (and his confederates') pockets.
Blumeyer's Skilling claim fails for simpler
reasons. First, Blumeyer raised on direct appeal a similar
challenge to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. The
Eighth Circuit rejected that challenge, concluding that
Blumeyer's payment to a state legislator to introduce
legislation beneficial to Blumeyer's company deprived
citizens of Missouri of the legislator's honest
services…Blumeyer cannot raise that failed challenge
again in a § 2241 petition based on a new Supreme Court
Case. Second, Blumeyer's claim fails under
Skilling. He says his conduct did not amount to
bribery or kick-backs, the only schemes that the Supreme
Court held in Skilling are covered under §
1346. Blumeyer had paid the legislator to introduce and
sponsor legislation that would benefit Blumeyer's
company; in other words, Blumeyer bribed him. What
Blumeyer really is saying is that the government's case
highlighted legitimate business dealings and not fraudulent
or illegal activities. The jury disagreed, and so did the
Eighth Circuit. Blumeyer cannot use § 2241 to usurp the
deference given to those decisions.
Blumeyer v. Walton, No. 13-3356 (7th Cir. Jan 13,
April 25, 2016, Blumeyer, through counsel, filed his Petition
for Writ of Error Coram Nobis pursuant to the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651. In his Petition, he raises the following
issues: (1) whether his money laundering convictions must be
vacated in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Santos, (2) whether his theft of honest services
conviction must be vacated in light of Skilling and
Black, and (3) “whether he may now advance and
prevail on an actual innocence claim in light of these
decisions and others.” (Petition at 5.)
writ of coram nobis is an ‘extraordinary remedy, '
and courts should grant the writ ‘only under
circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice'
and to correct errors ‘of the most fundamental
character.'” United States v.
Camacho-Bordes, 94 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 1996)
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502,
511-12 (1954)). “Accordingly, a petitioner must show a
compelling basis before coram nobis relief will be
granted…and the movant must articulate the fundamental
errors and compelling circumstances for relief in the
application for coram nobis.” Id. (quotations
and citations omitted); see also Morgan, 346 U.S. at
511 (“Continuation of litigation after final judgment
and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review
should be allowed through this extraordinary remedy only
under circumstances compelling such action to achieve
justice.”). A petitioner must also provide sound
reasons for his failure to seek appropriate earlier relief.
See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512; McFadden v. United
States, 439 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1971). A writ of
error coram nobis cannot be used to relitigate issues already
reviewed during prior post-conviction proceedings. See
Willis v. United States, 654 F.2d 23, 24 (8th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (absent credible new evidence or subsequent
change in law, coram nobis petitioner is not entitled to
another review of issues previously litigated and fully
explored in § 2255 proceedings).
forth above, the issues Blumeyer raises in his Petition were
previously litigated and adversely decided against him in
prior section 2255 proceedings. In addition, Blumeyer has
failed to present new evidence or a change in the law that
would justify reconsideration of his claims. Thus, the Court
finds that his claims are procedurally barred. See
Willis, 654 F.2d at 24; Katz v. United States,
No. 4:11CV513 CDP, 2012 WL 262675, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 27,
2012) (declining to reexamine same legal and factual issues
that were previously adjudicated by another district judge in
§ 2255 proceedings; setting forth factors that court
considers in determining whether controlling weight may be
given to denial of prior application for § 2255);
cf. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“The writ of error coram nobis is limited
to defects that sap the proceeding of any ...