United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. The motion has been fully briefed and
the matter is ripe for disposition. For the following
reasons, the Court will grant the motion.
Roy Phillips, who was an inmate at the Northeast Correctional
Center (“NECC”), filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against numerous Missouri
Department of Corrections employees. This case has a
complicated procedural history which, for the sake of
brevity, is omitted in this memorandum. Remaining for
disposition in this case are: Count I against defendants
James Hurley, Tyree Butler, Kristin Cutt, and Larry Allen
claims violations regarding plaintiff’s placement and
continuation in administrative segregation; Count II against
defendant James Hurley claims a failure to replace broken
eyeglasses; and Count III against defendants James Hurley,
Marsha Kiel, and Amber Grote claims interference with legal
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court
may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court demonstrates that “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273
(8th Cir.1988). After the moving party discharges this
burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there
is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of
setting forth affirmative evidence and specific facts by
affidavit and other evidence showing that there is a genuine
dispute of a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of
any inferences that logically can be drawn from those facts.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Woods v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.
2005). “Where parties file cross-motions for
summary judgment, each summary judgment motion must be
evaluated independently to determine whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists and whether the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Allen v.
Missouri, 4:11CV2224 JAR, 2013 WL 2156259, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. May 17, 2013) (citing Husinga v. Federal-Mogul
Ignition Co., 519 F.Supp.2d 929, 942 (S.D. Iowa 2007)).
The Parties’ Statements of Fact
Court has reviewed the statements, the responses, and the
supporting documentation, and, where appropriate, will accept
facts as supported by appropriate admissible evidence. In
accordance with Local Rule 4.01 (E), all matters set forth in
the movants’ statement of facts are deemed admitted
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party.
Unless otherwise indicated, the facts set forth below are
goes to great lengths to dispute the defendants’
statement of facts and argue that those facts are irrelevant.
Plaintiff relies primarily on his own deposition testimony
and affidavit to dispute defendants’ facts. Although
there are a multitude of disputed facts, the material facts
necessary to make the determination on the claims alleged are
undisputed and/or are deemed admitted because they are not
for each of the remaining counts will be discussed below.
seek summary judgment on each of the remaining counts.
Count I: placement and continuation in administrative
has been incarcerated at Farmington Correctional Center (FCC)
in Farmington, Missouri, and at Northeast Correctional Center
(NECC) in Bowling Green, Missouri. Plaintiff transferred from
FCC to NECC on June 5, 2012. Defendant Hurley was the Warden
of NECC, defendant Butler was a Functional Unit Manager
(FUM), defendant Cutt was a Corrections Case Manager II (CCM
II), and defendant Allen was a Corrections Officer III (CO
III). At the time of the alleged incidents, defendant Butler
was assigned to the administrative segregation unit and
served as the head of the administrative segregation
committee. Defendant Cutt was, at times, assigned to the
administrative segregation unit and served on the
administrative segregation committee. ...