United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MARIA P. KOSSMEYER, Plaintiff,
LILLIBRIDGE HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the SAMC Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 13] and Defendant Lillibridge's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 16]. Plaintiff has filed a consolidated Response in Opposition to the Motions. [Doc. No. 18]. The SAMC Defendants have filed a Reply [Doc. No. 19]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss will be granted.
Facts and Background
Plaintiff Maria P. Kossmeyer ("Plaintiff") is a former employee of Defendant Lillibridge Healthcare Services, Inc. ("Lillibridge"). Plaintiff, a sixty-four year old female, was hired by Defendant Lillibridge in September 2011 as a General Manager responsible for managing medical buildings. Four of the seven buildings Plaintiff managed were located on land owned by Defendant St. Anthony's Medical Center ("SAMC") and an entity known as Ventas.
Plaintiff's primary contact at SAMC was Defendant Brad Taylor ("Taylor, " or, collectively with SAMC, the "SAMC Defendants"). Throughout her employment, Plaintiff had periodic meetings with Defendant Taylor in which she reported to him, among other things, maintenance issues that needed to be addressed and/or repaired at the medical office buildings Plaintiff was responsible for managing. Additionally, Taylor would give Plaintiff a schedule dictating when maintenance or repair measures would be undertaken, as well as deadlines for completing maintenance or repair projects.
Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Defendant Taylor engaged in behavior such as berating her in a belligerent and belittling fashion. In May 2012, Plaintiff refused Taylor's directive to start HVAC units at SAMC's Fenton Urgent Care facility following a fire restoration project because the fire department had tagged the units as requiring inspection before they could be started. Despite Plaintiff's explanation, Taylor berated her as he had before, but for the first time in front of contractors and other representatives of SAMC, as Taylor attempted to intimidate Plaintiff into starting the HVAC units without obtaining the legally-required approval from the fire department. Plaintiff reported the incident to her supervisor with Lillibridge, as well as Lillibridge's Vice President of Property Management, and its human resources department. Plaintiff never received a response to her complaint of discrimination and harassment.
On June 14, 2012, Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Lillibridge was terminated by the same individuals to whom she had lodged her complaint of discrimination and harassment. At that time, and several occasions thereafter, Plaintiff was told by representatives of Lillibridge that she was an excellent employee but because of a request by Taylor and SAMC to remove Plaintiff as the General Manager of the medical office buildings, Lillibridge had no choice but to terminate Plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint on October 15, 2014. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on December 12, 2014. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges gender and age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). In Count II, Plaintiff alleges retaliation in violation of the same statutes. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges age and gender harassment in violation of the same statutes. Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiff alleges wrongful termination in violation of Missouri public policy.
A complaint must set out a "short and plain statement of [a plaintiff's] claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, a plaintiff must plead facts from which the court can draw a "reasonable inference" of liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" but must contain more than mere "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements" or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. An "unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation" will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, " id. at 679, which "raise a right to relief above the speculative level, " Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Under Twombly and Iqbal, "[a] plaintiff... must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility." Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014). If the plaintiff "inform[s] the [defendant] of the factual basis for [her] complaint, [she] [is] required to do no more to stave off threshold dismissal for want of an adequate statement of [her] claim." Id.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court can "choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Turning to any "well-pleaded factual allegations, " the court should "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. The court may only consider the initial pleadings. Brooks v. Midwest Heart Grp., 655 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 2011).
The SAMC Defendants and Defendant Lillibridge all argue that Plaintiff's claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act in Counts I, II, and III must be dismissed because they are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.111.1. Plaintiff concedes this point and, accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motions as ...