United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RODNEY W. SIPPEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company (“Allied”)’s Motion for Summary Judgment in this insurance coverage dispute. Plaintiff Lisa Burger opposes this motion and the issues are fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, I will grant Allied’s motion for summary judgment.
On December 3, 2012, Lisa Burger was injured in a car accident caused by the driver of another car, Sandra Shandy. After the accident, Burger made a claim against Shandy for her injuries. Her claim was settled for $100, 000, the limit of Shandy’s insurance policy. Because Burger claims her injuries exceed $100, 000, she sought additional coverage under an “underinsured motorist” provision in her own insurance policy, issued by Allied. Allied refused to pay.
On January 20, 2014, Burger filed suit against Allied in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, seeking payment of her UIM benefits under the Allied policy and damages for vexatious refusal pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. §375.420. On March 3, 2014, Allied removed this case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction.
Allied now seeks summary judgment, arguing that the vehicle driven by Shandy is not an “underinsured motor vehicle” as defined by the policy, and therefore Burger is not entitled to recovery. Burger argues that the language of the policy, when read as a whole, is ambiguous as to the meaning of “underinsured motorist coverage” and must be construed against the insurer for a finding that she is entitled to UIM coverage.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on his pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the essential elements of his case on which he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 324. In resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy. Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004).
“State law governs the interpretation of insurance policies when federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.” Secura Ins. v. Horizon Plumbing, Inc., 670 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2012). Missouri law governs this insurance contract. Under Missouri law, the interpretation of the meaning of an insurance policy is a question of law. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. 1405 Associates, Inc., 340 F.3d 547, 547 (8th Cir. 2003). There is no statute in Missouri that requires drivers to purchase UIM coverage. Lynch v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 531, 539 (Mo.Ct.App. 2010). Accordingly, the limits of UIM coverage are determined by the insurance contract. Id.
The general rules for interpretation of contracts apply to insurance policies. Peters v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). When “construing the terms of an insurance policy, this Court applies the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance, and resolves ambiguities in favor of the insured.” Ritchie v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 307 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo. 2009). Courts should not interpret policy provisions in isolation but rather evaluate policies as a whole. Id. If the policy language is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. Id. But if the language is ambiguous, courts should construe the policy in favor of the insured. Id. The fact that the parties disagree over the policy’s interpretation does not render a term ambiguous. O’Rourke v. Esurance Ins. Co., 325 S.W.3d 395, 398 (Mo.Ct.App. 2010). “[A]mbiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy. Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions.” Seeck v. Geico General Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d, 129, 132 (Mo. banc. 2007). If an insurance clause “appears to provide coverage but other clauses indicate that such coverage is not provided, then the policy is ambiguous.” Id. at 134. However, a court must not “unreasonably distort the language of a policy or exercise inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity when none exists.” Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Mo. 2007).
A. The Policy
The relevant portions of the Allied policy are as follows:
1. UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE INSURING AGREEMENT
A. We will pay compensatory damages which an “insured” is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an “underinsured motor ...