Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, Fourth Division
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Honorable Gloria Clark Reno.
For Appellant: Shelter Mutual Ins. Co., Seth G. Gausnell, Thomas G. Wilmowski, Jr., St. Louis, Missouri.
For Respondent: Jessie M. Eiler, Gonzalo Fernandez, St. Louis, Missouri.
ROY L. RICHTER, Judge. Patricia L. Cohen, P.J., concurs. Robert M. Clayton III, J., concurs.
ROY L. RICHTER, Judge
Driver was involved in an automobile accident with Deandreis Dowell (" Dowell" ) on April 4, 2012. Driver was driving a 2002 Chevrolet Impala, which was titled in his mother's name, Pam Carter, and which was insured by Shelter under Policy No. 24-1-3761928-1 (" the Impala Policy" ). Driver's mother also owned a Pontiac Torrent, which was jointly titled in both Driver's and his mother's names, and which was insured by a separate insurance policy with Shelter (" the Torrent Policy" ). Both policies contained identical uninsured motorist coverage language.
Driver sustained substantial injuries from the accident, and on May 17, 2012, he filed a lawsuit against Shelter and Dowell. Shelter filed a motion for summary judgment regarding the issue of uninsured motorist coverage available to Driver. The trial court denied Shelter's motion for summary judgment on November 19, 2013, and then granted Shelter's Consent Motion to Designate Order as Judgment and Certify Judgment as Final on July 31, 2014. This appeal follows.
Shelter raises two points on appeal. First, Shelter claims the trial court erred in denying Shelter's motion for summary judgment because Driver should have been entitled to only $25,000 in uninsured motor vehicle liability coverage. Shelter argues that Driver does not fall into the " Category A" insured under either of his policies with Shelter, and therefore he must fall under " Category B," which would entitle him to only $25,000 in uninsured motor vehicle liability coverage.
In Shelter's second and final point, it claims the trial court erred in finding that Driver is entitled to $100,000 in uninsured motor vehicle coverage because the trial court did not have the authority to make such a determination. Shelter argues that because Driver never filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of Driver was invalid.
However, we will not reach Shelter's arguments as we do not have authority to resolve this appeal. " A prerequisite to appellate review is that there be a final judgment." Boley v. Knowles, 905 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. banc 1995), citing Section 512.020, RSMo (2004). If the trial court order was not a final judgment, we lack authority and the appeal must be dismissed.
Boley, 905 S.W.2d at 88. Normally an appealable judgment will dispose of all issues in a case, leaving nothing for further determination. Id. If a case has multiple claims, Rule 74.01(b) provides an exception to this " finality rule" by allowing the trial court to enter judgment on less than all the claims and certify there is " 'no just reason for delay.'" Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997), quoting
Boley, 905 S.W.2d at 88.
For a trial court to designate its judgment as final pertaining to certain claims, the order must dispose of a distinct judicial unit. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244. A distinct judicial unit for an appeal ...