United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
March 2, 2015
OTIS McDOWELL, Plaintiff,
HEATHER KREGG, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JEAN C. HAMILTON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on review of plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2]. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant plaintiff in forma pauperis status and assess an initial partial filing fee of $9.78. In addition, the Court will (1) dismiss plaintiff's official-capacity claims against defendant Heather Kregg; and (2) order the Clerk of Court to issue process on the complaint as to defendant Kregg in her individual capacity.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of $10.83 and an average monthly balance of $48.92. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $9.78, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly balance.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff's proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. Id. at 1950-52.
In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center, brings this action for monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Heather Kregg (Correctional Officer). Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff is alleging that he was brutally attacked on April 2, 2014, after Kregg intentionally allowed another inmate to enter plaintiff's cell and assault him. Plaintiff alleges that he was "cut across [his] chest with a razor and [was] hit in the eye with a wooden brush." Plaintiff is suing defendant in both her individual and official capacities for deliberate indifference to his safety and security.
I. Official Capacity Claims
Naming a government official in his or her official capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity that employs the official, in this case the State of Missouri. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). "[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are persons' under § 1983." Id. As a result, the complaint is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to defendant Heather Kregg in her official capacity.
II. Individual Capacity Claims
Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allegations against defendant Kregg in her individual capacity state a claim for Eighth Amendment violations, and therefore, the Court will order process to issue against said defendant.
III. Motion for Counsel
Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel on the grounds that he has a meritorious case and he lacks sufficient funds to pay an attorney.
"A pro se litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case." Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, the Court considers relevant factors, such as the complexity of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim. Id.
After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time. This case is neither factually nor legally complex. Moreover, it is evident that plaintiff is able to present his claims, because the Court has ordered defendant to respond to plaintiff's individual-capacity claims. Consequently, the motion will be denied at this time, without prejudice.
In accordance with the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of $9.78 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court, " and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process or cause process to be issued upon the complaint as to defendant Heather Kregg in her individual capacity only.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Heather Kregg, in her individual capacity, shall reply to the complaint within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's official-capacity claims against defendant Heather Kregg are DISMISSED without prejudice. See 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [Doc. #4] is DENIED, without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to this Court's differentiated case management system, this case is assigned to Track 5B (prisoner actions-standard).
A separate Order of Partial Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.