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In re Shahid

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

December 22, 2014

FNBN I, LLC by PennyMac Loan Servicing, LLC, its servicing agent, Defendant/Appellee, and AMY QUINTERO, Defendant/Appellee. SHARHONDA T. SHAHID, Plaintiff/Appellant,


RONNIE L. WHITE, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Notice of Appeal by Sharhonda T. Shahid (hereinafter "Shahid") (ECF No. 1), under 28 U.S.C. ยง158(a)(3) from the Bankruptcy Court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of FNBN 1, LLC ("FNBN") and Amy Quintero ("Quintero") (Case No. 12-4006, ECF No. 88). In addition, Shahid has filed a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal (ECF Nos. 8-9) and Motion for Oral Argument (ECF No. 10). The Court enters Judgment in favor of FNBN and Quintero and denies all other pending motions as moot.


On March 8, 2007, Appellant Shahid entered into a loan agreement with The First National Bank of Arizona ("FNB of Arizona"), predecessor in interest to Appellee FNBN. Shahid executed a Promissory Note ("Note") in the amount of $299, 000. The Note was secured by a Deed of Trust ("DOT"), which granted a security interest in favor of FNB of Arizona as to the real property commonly known as 4335 Keevenshore Drive, Florissant, Missouri 63034. The Note secured by the Deed of Trust defines "Lender" as "First National Bank of Arizona." The Note further states that the Lender or anyone who takes the Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under the Note is called the "Note Holder."

On or around June 30, 2008, FNB of Arizona merged with The First National Bank of Nevada ("FNB of Nevada"). On July 25, 2008, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") closed FNB of Nevada and named the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as Receiver. FNBN took title to the aforementioned loan on December 29, 2008 pursuant to a "Loan Contribution and Assignment Agreement" entered into between FNBN and FDIC as Receiver for FNB of Nevada. Pursuant to the agreement, FDIC transferred to FNBN all of its right, title, and interest in the loans described in the attachment thereto, which included Shahid's loan. On the same day, FNBN and PennyMac Loan Services ("PennyMac") entered into a "Servicing Agreement" whereby PennyMac would act as servicer and agent of FNBN.

The Note has three allonges. The first allonge bears two endorsements. The first endorsement indicates a transfer from FNB Arizona to FNB Nevada. The second endorsement shows a transfer from FNB Nevada to FDIC as Receiver for FNB Nevada. The Note contains a second allonge which contains an endorsement representing a transfer of the Note from the FDIC as Receiver for FNB Nevada to FNBN. The Note contains a third allonge which contains an endorsement in blank. All three allonges are physically attached to the Note. The original Note is in the possession of the attorney for Creditor FNBN and is currently secured in a fire proof safe.

On September 5, 2012, Shahid filed a Petition seeking relief under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Eastern District of Missouri. See Case No. 13-48698. In Schedule A of her Petition, Shahid identified an interest in the property located at 4335 Keevenshore Drive, Florissant, Missouri 63034 ("Property"). FNBN filed a Proof of Secured Claim on October 22, 2012. (Case No. 13-48698, ECF No. 20). Appellant filed two objections to FNBN's Proof of Claim. Upon denial of Shahid's objection to FNBN's Proof of Claim and FNBN's filing of a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay, Shahid initiated the Adversary Action from which this appeal arises (Case No. 4:13-4006). Shahid's Adversary Complaint was filed against FNBN and Amy Quintero ("Quintero"). After cross filings of motions for summary judgment, the entered Judgment in favor of FNBN and Quintero on June 24, 2014.


On appeal, "the district court reviews the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error." In re Tasic, No. 4:13CV00479 ERW, 2013 WL 2425133, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 4, 2013)(citing In re O'Brien, 351 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 2003)).

The instant case was decided by cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper ifthe evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 258.

In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).


Plaintiff raises four points ...

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