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State v. Severance

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, Second Division

November 6, 2014

STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent,
DALE ALLEN SEVERANCE, Defendant-Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY. Honorable Jason R. Brown, Associate Circuit Judge.

ERIKA R. ELIASON, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

GREGORY L. BARNES, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.




Page 279

This appeal concerns whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (" the IAD" ) required the dismissal of the criminal case pending against Dale Allen Severance (" Defendant" ). See section 217.490 et seq.[1] Because Defendant did not materially comply with the requirements of the IAD -- and the State did not waive those requirements -- we answer that question in the negative and affirm Defendant's felony convictions for driving while intoxicated (" DWI" ) and driving while license revoked (" DWLR" ). See sections 577.010 and 302.321.

Applicable Principles of Review and Governing Law

Whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the IAD to the facts is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Vinson, 182 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Mo.App.2006); State v. Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d 180, 184

Page 280

(Mo.App.2005). To the extent the court's application of the law was based upon the evidence presented, we defer to the court's factual findings and credibility determinations. State v. Davis, 210 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Mo.App.2006).

State v. Woods, 259 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008).

" The IAD is a congressionally-sanctioned interstate agreement that permits a prisoner in one state to seek disposition of criminal charges filed against him by [a] second state." Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d at 184. Section 217.490, Art. III.1 of the IAD provides:

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.

Section 217.490, Art. III.2 provides that the prisoner is to provide the " written notice and request for final disposition" to the " warden . . . or other official having custody of him[.]" That official is then directed to forward those documents " with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court[.]" Id. The 180-day time limit " does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him." Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993); see also Carbaugh v. State, 348 S.W.3d 871, 878 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011).

" [I]f the prisoner's request does not comply with the statute, the 180--day time period does not begin to run." State v. Bury, S.W.3d , No. SD32661, 445 S.W.3d 594, 2014 WL 1226933 at *3 (Mo. App. S.D. Mar. 25, 2014). For purposes of determining compliance, the IAD is to be construed liberally so as to favor the purpose of promptly disposing of such detainers. Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d at 184 ; see also section 217.490, Art. IX.

When an irregularity in compliance with the [IAD] results from the failure of the official having custody of the prisoner to perform the official's duty according to the statute, and does not result in the omission of an " essential" element of compliance with the statute, it ...

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