United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
J. MILES LEISMAN, et al., Plaintiffs,
ARCHWAY MEDICAL, INC., Defendants
For J. Miles Leisman, Plaintiff: Kevin J. Dolley, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC, St. Louis, MO; Jonathan Edward Skrabacz, LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN J. DOLLEY, St. Louis, MO.
For Northstar Medical LLC, Patrick Cramer, Floyd Schmidt, Plaintiffs: Jonathan Edward Skrabacz, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICE OF KEVIN J. DOLLEY, St. Louis, MO; Kevin J. Dolley, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF KEVIN J. DOLLEY, LLC, St. Louis, MO.
For Archway Medical, Inc., Defendant: Timothy J. Lemen, LEAD ATTORNEY, ROSSITER AND BOOCK, Clayton, MO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RONNIE L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV, V, and VI of Plaintiff's Petition. The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Plaintiffs J. Miles Leisman, Northstar Medical, LLC, Patrick Cramer, and Floyd Schmidt filed a First Amended Complaint in federal court on August 28, 2014, after Defendant Archway Medical, Inc. (" Archway" ) removed the original Petition from the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri. (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 14; Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1) Plaintiffs claim that Archway failed to pay them commissions on sales pursuant to a Consulting Agreement between the parties. (First Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 9-14, ECF No. 14) Specifically, Plaintiffs sold Tornier products to medical providers in both Missouri and Illinois. ( Id. at ¶ 11) Plaintiffs were supposed to be paid commissions based on the manufacturer's contracted percentage commission rate. ( Id. at ¶ ¶ 10, 12-13) However, after Tornier increased the sales commission rate paid to Defendant Archway, Plaintiffs allege that Archway failed to pay Plaintiffs at the contractually agreed upon commission rate. ( Id. at ¶ 14)
Plaintiffs filed a six-count First Amended Complaint, alleging violations of the Missouri Commission Sales Act (Count I); violations of the Illinois Sales Representatives Act (Count II); Breach of Contract (Count III); Quantum Meruit (Count IV); Promissory Estoppel (Count V); and Unjust
Enrichment (Count VI). On July 14, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts I, IV, V, and VI under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs filed their Response in Opposition on July 24, 2014, and Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum on September 8, 2014.
Standard for Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if the complaint fails to plead " enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the " no set of facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). While the Court cautioned that the holding does not require a heightened fact pleading of specifics, " a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555. In other words, " [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Id. This standard simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the claim. Id. at 556.
Courts must liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept the factual allegations as true. See Id. at 555; see also Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that in a motion to dismiss, courts accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that courts should liberally construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Further a court should not dismiss the complaint simply because the court is doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, " [w]here the allegations show on the face of the ...