United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
E. RICHARD WEBBER, Senior District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on "Defendant Hastings' Motion to Dismiss" [ECF No. 18].
On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff Robbin Croskey ("Plaintiff") filed a four-count Complaint for redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants County of St. Louis, Dr. Mary Hastings ("Dr. Hastings"), Unknown Correctional Officers of County of St. Louis, and Unknown Medical Personnel of County of St. Louis, alleging injuries incurred while incarcerated [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following Section 1983 claims: Count 1, Denial of Medical Treatment; Count 2, Failure to Intervene; Count 3, Conspiracy to Deprive Constitutional Rights; and Count 4, Supervisor Liability. Dr. Hastings is sued in her individual capacity.
Dr. Hastings filed her Motion to Dismiss on July 11, 2014 [ECF No. 18]. On July 28, 2014, the Court, finding Plaintiff failed to file a timely Response to Dr. Hastings' Motion to Dismiss, issued an Order directing Plaintiff to show cause, no later than August 4, 2014, why Dr. Hastings' motion should not be granted [ECF No. 20]. Plaintiff responded to the Court's Show Cause Order by filing "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" on August 4, 2014 [ECF No. 21].
II. LEGAL STANDARD: MOTION TO DISMISS
A party may move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint for "fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test "the sufficiency of a complaint[.]" M.M. Silta, Inc. v. Cleveland Cliffs, Inc., 616 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2010).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Ordinarily, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of a motion to dismiss; however, materials attached to the complaint may also be considered in construing its sufficiency. Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2011).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court "must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff[.]" Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010). However, if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recovery on a legal theory, that claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Crest Constr. II, Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2011). "Threadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although courts must accept all factual allegations as true, they are not bound to take as true "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the following pertinent facts, as alleged in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and contained in exhibits incorporated therein, are accepted as true.
Plaintiff, a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, is a forty-six-year-old mother of three children. Plaintiff was arrested on June 1, 2011, and was remanded to the custody and control of the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services. At the time of her arrest, Plaintiff was approximately four weeks pregnant. Medical personnel were made aware of her pregnancy when Plaintiff was delivered to the St. Louis County Jail. Between June 1 and 16, 2011, Dr. Hastings was employed by the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services to provide medical services to inmates, including Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was taken to Barnes Jewish Hospital on June 1, 2011, for treatment of abdominal cramping, vaginal discharge, and dizziness. Doctors released Plaintiff with orders for further care. Specifically, they ordered she return to the hospital within forty-eight hours, or immediately if she suffered any vaginal bleeding.
For seven days following her discharge from the hospital, Plaintiff suffered vaginal bleeding and abdominal cramping. Defendants knew, or should have known, Plaintiff needed medical attention to treat her pregnancy complications. After Plaintiff's return from the hospital, Defendants reached an agreement to deny Plaintiff necessary medical attention, and in furtherance of the conspiracy, ...